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objective. To evaluate the long-term impact of successive interventions on rates of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA)
colonization or infection and MRSA bacteremia in an endemic hospital-wide situation.
design. Quasi-experimental, interrupted time-series analysis. The impact of the interventions was analyzed by use of segmented regression.
Representative MRSA isolates were typed by use of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis.
setting. A 950-bed teaching hospital in Seville, Spain.
patients. All patients admitted to the hospital during the period from 1995 through 2008.
methods. Three successive interventions were studied: (1) contact precautions, with no active surveillance for MRSA; (2) targeted active
surveillance for MRSA in patients and healthcare workers in specific wards, prioritized according to clinical epidemiology data; and (3)
targeted active surveillance for MRSA in patients admitted from other medical centers.
results. Neither the preintervention rate of MRSA colonization or infection (0.56 cases per 1,000 patient-days [95% confidence interval
{CI}, 0.49–0.62 cases per 1,000 patient-days]) nor the slope for the rate of MRSA colonization or infection changed significantly after the
first intervention. The rate decreased significantly to 0.28 cases per 1,000 patient-days (95% CI, 0.17–0.40 cases per 1,000 patient-days)
after the second intervention and to 0.07 cases per 1,000 patient-days (95% CI, 0.06–0.08 cases per 1,000 patient-days) after the third
intervention, and the rate remained at a similar level for 8 years. The MRSA bacteremia rate decreased by 80%, whereas the rate of
bacteremia due to methicillin-susceptible S. aureus did not change. Eighty-three percent of the MRSA isolates identified were clonally
related. All MRSA isolates obtained from healthcare workers were clonally related to those recovered from patients who were in their care.
conclusion. Our data indicate that long-term control of endemic MRSA is feasible in tertiary care centers. The use of targeted active
surveillance for MRSA in patients and healthcare workers in specific wards (identified by means of analysis of clinical epidemiology data)
and the use of decolonization were key to the success of the program.
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Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is a leading
cause of healthcare-associated infection. Infections caused by
MRSA are associated with increased cost and mortality.1,2 Rates
of nosocomial infection caused by MRSA are alarmingly high
in many countries and have been increasing worldwide over
recent years.3-5 Control of MRSA transmission within the hos-
pital environment is presently a challenge, particularly in en-
demic situations. The medical literature on the epidemiology
and control of healthcare-associated MRSA is plentiful, al-
though most studies focus on particular aspects, such as out-
break control, specific infection control measures, or specific
wards. At the same time, there are limited data available eval-
uating the impact of comprehensive infection control programs
on hospital-wide MRSA or the long-term efficacy of infection
control measures in endemic situations.6-10 Data from Spanish
multicenter studies have shown that there was a significant
increase in the prevalence of MRSA colonization or infection
from 1994 (16%) to 2002 (31%)5 but that the prevalence
reached a plateau at 29% in 2006.11 Data from the European
Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System—which includes
data from bacteremic episodes—have shown that MRSA prev-
alence has been stable since 2000, at around 27%.12
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table 1. Summary of Our Study Evaluating the Long-Term Impact of Successive Interventions on Rates of Colonization or Infection
due to Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and Rates of Bacteremia due to MRSA and Methicillin-Susceptible S. aureus
(MSSA), at Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena in Seville, Spain
Variable Definition
Setting 950-bed, acute care referral tertiary center serving a population of 550,000
Infection control team Hospital epidemiologist, infectious diseases physician, and microbiologist (all part time); 3.5 full-
time–equivalent infection control nurses.
Entire study period January 1995–December 2008
Characteristics of patient population All admitted patients (∼40,000 per year) in endemic MRSA setting
Design Retrospective interrupted time series analyzed by use of segmented regression models
Intervention
First Use of contact precautions for all patients colonized or infected with MRSA and use of cleaning
and disinfection protocol (all implemented in January 1997).
Second Identification of wards with MRSA transmission, based on clinical epidemiology; active surveil-
lance for MRSA in colonized patients and healthcare workers in these wards; and decoloniza-
tion (all implemented in January 1999).
Third Active surveillance for MRSA in colonized patients readmitted or admitted from long-term care
facilities or other hospitals (implemented January 2001).
Study period
Period A January 1995–December 1996 (preintervention period)
Period B January 1997–December 1998
Period C January 1999–December 2000
Period D January 2001–December 2008
Outcome measures Bimonthly incidences of healthcare-associated colonization or infection due to MRSA and
healthcare-associated bacteremia due to MRSA and MSSA
Several guidelines have been published with recommen-
dations for controlling the spread of MRSA.13-16 MRSA control
measures are complex, costly, and time-consuming. Because
there remains some uncertainty about the best approach for
preventing and controlling the spread of endemic hospital-
wide MRSA,17 many hospitals probably do not devote enough
resources to infection control activities, and there is wide
variation in the extent of implementation of infection control
programs.18-21
In our hospital, no control measures for MRSA were un-
dertaken until 1997. Since then, a comprehensive hospital-
wide MRSA control program has been implemented in dif-
ferent phases. Our objective was to evaluate the impact of
different bundles of MRSA control measures on the evolution
of rates of MRSA colonization or infection and on the evo-
lution of rates of bacteremia due to MRSA.
methods
We followed the ORION (Outbreak Reports and Intervention
studies Of Nosocomial infection) statement for transparent
reporting of intervention studies concerning nosocomial in-
fections.22 A summary of methods can be found in Table 1.
Study Site
The Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena in Seville, Spain,
is a 950-bed teaching hospital that receives approximately
40,000 admissions every year. In wards without an intensive
care unit, 70% of the rooms have 3 beds, and 30% are private;
the intensive care units had an open structure during the
study period. An active global infection control program was
implemented in 1995 that included the review and imple-
mentation of infection control protocols, the use of educa-
tional sessions, and the regular reporting of surveillance re-
sults. Also in 1995, a successful program using the bundle
approach to control endemic Acinetobacter baumannii was
implemented.23 The antibiotic policy did not change during
the study period.
Study Design
To investigate the effects of the successive interventions spe-
cifically implemented to control the spread of MRSA, a ret-
rospective, quasi-experimental, interrupted time-series study
was used. The epidemiology of MRSA during the study period
was characterized by use of basic clinical epidemiological data
and molecular techniques.
Study Periods and Interventions
To evaluate the impact of 3 successive bundles of interven-
tions, 4 periods were studied: period A (the preintervention
period from January 1995 to December 1996), period B (the
first intervention period from January 1997 to December
1998), period C (the second intervention period from January
1999 to December 2000), and period D (the third intervention
period from January 2001 to December 2008). Likewise, hand
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table 2. Data on Case Mix, Antibiotic Use, and Epidemiology of Colonization or Infection due to Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (MRSA) and Bacteremia due to MRSA and Methicillin-Susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) in Patients at Hospital Universitario Virgen
Macarena in Seville, Spain, during 4 Study Periods
Variable
Period A
(1995–1996)
Period B
(1997–1998)
Period C
(1999–2000)
Period D
(2001–2008)
Mean age of admitted patients (95% CI), years 50 (48–53) 52 (49–52) 53 (52–55) 54 (53–55)
Mean no. of diagnoses per patient (95% CI) 1.49 (1.44–1.55) 1.52 (1.47–1.57) 1.75 (1.62–1.83) 1.74 (1.70–1.77)
Antibiotic consumption, DDDs per 100 patient-days
Total 46 46 47 48
Fluoroquinolones 1.6 2.6 4.2 5.6
Third-generation cephalosporins 11.6 11.5 12.1 10.5
Glycopeptides 7.8 7.9 4.8 4.9
Mean no. of new cases of MRSA colonization or infec-
tion, per year 190 195 76 65
Mean proportion (%) of new cases of MRSA colonization
or infection, per year, detected by use of clinical
sample 190/190 (100) 193/195 (99) 43/76 (57)a 34/65 (52)a
Mean proportion (%) of new cases of MRSA coloniza-
tion, per year, detected by use of surveillance sample 0 2/195 (1) 32/76 (42)a 26/65 (40)a
Mean proportion (%) of new cases of healthcare-associ-
ated MRSA colonization or infection detected in the
first 3 calendar days of hospital admission 8/190 (4) 10/195 (5) 7/76 (9) 8/65 (12)b
Mean proportion (%) of new cases of MRSA coloniza-
tion, per year, admitted from other healthcare
centers 0 0 1/76 (1) 5/65 (8)c
Mean bimonthly no. of new cases of healthcare-associated
MRSA colonization or infection, per 1,000 patient-
days (95% CI) 0.56 (0.49–0.62) 0.55 (0.48–0.61) 0.28 (0.17–0.40) 0.07 (0.06–0.08)
Mean bimonthly percentage of methicillin resistance
among healthcare-associated S. aureus isolates (95%
CI) 47 (37–54) 48 (38–55) 25 (19–30)a 11 (8–14)a,c
Mean bimonthly no. of new cases of healthcare-associated
bacteremia due to MRSA, per 1,000 patient-days
(95% CI) 0.10 (0.08–0.12) 0.10 (0.08–1.13) 0.04 (0.03–0.05) 0.02 (0.0–0.03)
Mean bimonthly no. of new cases of healthcare-associated
bacteremia due to MSSA, per 1,000 patient-days
(95% CI) 0.12 (0.10–0.13) 0.11 (0.10–0.13) 0.11 (0.10–0.13) 0.12 (0.11–0.13)
note. P values were determined by comparing percentages. CI, confidence interval; DDDs, defined daily doses.
a (by Fisher exact test), compared with periods A and B.P ! .01
b , compared with period A, and , compared with period B.Pp .03 Pp .04
c (by Fisher exact test), compared with period C.P ! .01
hygiene was promoted during the period from 1995 through
2008 by use of educational sessions and annual campaigns.
Staffing levels did not change during the study period. During
period A, no specific measures were undertaken for patients
with MRSA colonization or infection. The 3 successive in-
terventions were as follows:
First intervention (period B). Contact precautions were
implemented in January 1997 for all patients colonized or
infected with MRSA, according to the recommendations of
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.24 Noncritical
patient care equipment was dedicated to individual patients
or cohorts. These patients were detected only via clinical sam-
ples because active surveillance was not performed. Patients
were placed in individual rooms (conventional wards) or in
cohorts in open-structure intensive care units. Adherence to
contact precautions was supervised and reinforced on a daily
basis by an infection control nurse. Contact precautions were
also implemented during all diagnostic or therapeutic ma-
neuvers. A strict cleaning policy, including disinfecting all
devices that came in contact with the patients, was also im-
plemented; sodium hypochlorite was used to clean surfaces,
and 70% ethyl alcohol was used to clean the noncritical med-
ical equipment.25 All of these measures were maintained dur-
ing the successive intervention periods.
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Second intervention (period C). In units where there was
transmission of MRSA, active surveillance for MRSA in pa-
tients and healthcare workers (HCWs) and decolonization
therapy were implemented in January 1999. Because the rates
of colonization or infection did not change with the use of
the previous MRSA control measures, active surveillance of
MRSA colonization in patients and HCWs was performed in
units with ongoing MRSA transmission. These units were
identified as follows. The epidemiological data on all patients
colonized or infected with MRSA during the preceding year
were analyzed. The ward where the patient was first hospi-
talized and where MRSA colonization or infection was first
detected was considered to be the location of acquisition; any
other ward or healthcare facility where the patient had been
admitted to or cared for in the preceding 2 years was also
considered to be the possible location of acquisition. Wards
and healthcare facilities with more than 1 attributable case
of MRSA colonization during a 3-month period were con-
sidered as having ongoing MRSA transmission. Active sur-
veillance was initiated in these wards successively, prioritizing
those with the highest number of assigned cases. Active sur-
veillance involved obtaining screening samples from all ad-
mitted patients to detect MRSA colonization, both at ad-
mission and every week thereafter, until no new cases were
detected during a 2-week period. Also, all HCWs attending
specific wards—including HCWs with frequent patient con-
tact who come from outside the hospital, such as physio-
therapists—were screened before they started their shift.
Screening samples obtained from patients comprised nasal
and perineal swab samples, open wound swab samples, res-
piratory tract samples from patients receiving mechanical
ventilation or with chronic respiratory disease, and urine
samples from catheterized patients. Only nasal swab samples
were obtained from HCWs. This process was reinitiated
whenever 2 or more cases were detected again separated by
less than a month. Roommates of patients with MRSA col-
onization were also screened in wards where there was no
active surveillance. All the measures adopted in the first in-
tervention (ie, period B) were also performed.
Every patient with MRSA colonization was evaluated for
application of the decolonization protocol; this involved ap-
plying mupirocin nasal ointment 3 times per day, plus daily
body washing with 2% chlorhexidine gluconate for 5 days.
The decolonization protocol was applied to patients without
open, colonized wounds or respiratory tract colonization,
without receipt of mechanical ventilation or a nasogastric
tube, without urinary tract colonization in the presence of a
urinary catheter, or without high-level mupirocin resistance.
HCWs with MRSA colonization followed the same decolo-
nization protocol. Nasal swab samples were obtained from
colonized HCWs 1 week after decolonization therapy, to
check for decolonization.
Third intervention (period D). Active surveillance for MRSA
in readmitted patients previously colonized with MRSA and
patients admitted from other healthcare centers was imple-
mented in January 2001. In addition to the implementation
of all the previously mentioned intervention measures, the third
intervention required that all patients admitted from other
hospitals or from long-term care facilities and all readmitted
patients previously colonized with MRSA also be screened by
use of the same protocol. Only readmitted patients previously
colonized with MRSA were placed under preemptive isolation
precautions. In addition, patients who had not been decolo-
nized during hospitalization were reevaluated in an outpatient
office, after hospital discharge, for decolonization therapy. Dis-
pensers containing alcohol solution for hand hygiene were in-
stalled in all rooms in November 2000. Alcohol hand rubs had
not been previously used in our healthcare center, but since
November 2000, annual educational sessions have been used
to promote hand hygiene with these products.
Microbiological Testing
S. aureus isolates were first identified by use of the MicroScan
system (Dade Behring) or the Vitek 2 system (bioMe´rieux)
and confirmed by use of the API Staph system (bioMe´rieux).
Antimicrobial susceptibility testing was performed by use of
both the Vitek 2 system and microdilution, according to Clin-
ical Laboratory Standards Institute (formerly known as the
National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standards) rec-
ommendations. Mupirocin susceptibility was determined in
strains isolated from nasal swab samples. Methicillin resis-
tance was determined by use of an oxacillin-salt agar screen-
ing test, according to Clinical Laboratory Standards Institute
guidelines. Surveillance samples were transported at room
temperature and processed within 1–3 hours after collection.
Swab samples were placed in tubes containing 1 mL of tryp-
tone soya broth with 6.5% sodium chloride for 24 hours and
subcultured on blood agar plates. Results were typically avail-
able in 36–48 hours. The clonal relatedness of selected isolates
was determined by use of pulsed-field gel electrophoresis
(PFGE), as described elsewhere.26 Whole chromosomal DNA
was digested with SmaI. The clonal relatedness of PFGE pat-
terns was determined according to the interpretative criteria
used by Tenover et al.27
Variables and Definitions
The main outcome measures were the bimonthly incidence
of healthcare-associated MRSA colonization or infection and
the bimonthly incidence of healthcare-associated bacteremia
due to MRSA, both defined as new cases per 1,000 patient-
days. Cases were considered healthcare associated if the first
sample yielding MRSA had been obtained more than 3 cal-
endar days after hospital admission or if the first sample
yielding MRSA had been obtained from an ambulatory pa-
tient who has an identified association with recent healthcare
delivery.28 For the calculation of incidences of MRSA colo-
nization or infection, only patients who had MRSA isolated
from clinical samples were included, because active surveil-
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figure 1. Bimonthly incidence rates of healthcare-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus colonization or infection during
the 4 different study periods (from January 1995 to December 2008) at Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena in Seville, Spain.
lance was not performed uniformly throughout the study
periods.
Statistical Analysis
The effect of the successive interventions was analyzed by use
of segmented regression analysis.29-31 In our study, we ana-
lyzed 3 interventions and 4 time periods (periods A–D); each
time period was defined by the incidence rate at the beginning
of the time period and the trend observed during the time
period. Both the rapid and gradual effects of the interventions
can be estimated by comparing the incidence rate and the
trend of a period with those of the preceding period. The
following model was fitted: Y p b0  (b1 # time)  (b2
# first intervention)  (b3 # time after first intervention)
 (b4 # second intervention)  (b5 # time after second
intervention)  (b6 # third intervention)  (b7 # time
after third intervention) e, where Y represents the incidence
of MRSA colonization or infection; b0 represents the baseline
incidence rate; b1 represents the change in the incidence rate
that occurred before implementation of the interventions; b2,
b4, and b6 represent the changes in the incidence rate im-
mediately after implementation of the first, second, and third
interventions, respectively; b3, b5, and b7 represent the
changes in the trend after implementation of each interven-
tion, compared with the trend before implementation of the
intervention; and e represents the error term. The model was
used to calculate the absolute change in incidence rate at
specific time points. Serial autocorrelation was studied by
visual inspection of residuals plotted against time and by use
of the Durbin-Watson statistic, for which values close to 2.00
indicate no serious autocorrelation.29
We could not incorporate data on potential confounders
to the model, because bimonthly data on these confounders
were not available. We opted therefore to analyze several types
of data sets, to provide an indirect control for confounding.
Annual prevalence data concerning age and number of di-
agnoses were used to evaluate potential differences in case
mix across the study periods and were obtained from yearly
point-prevalence studies.32 Antimicrobial consumption (mea-
sured as defined daily doses per 1,000 patient-days per year)
were obtained from the hospital pharmacy database. The in-
cidence of healthcare-associated bacteremia due to methicil-
lin-susceptible S. aureus (MSSA) was used to control for the
potential confounding effect of changes in the number of
blood culture samples obtained and in other infection control
measures not specifically aimed at controlling MRSA. Cate-
gorical variables (eg, rate of methicillin resistance, number
of patients with MRSA colonization detected by means of
active surveillance, and number of wards with patients with
MRSA colonization or infection) were compared by use of
the x2 test or the Fisher exact test, when necessary.
results
Patients
During the 13-year study period (from 1995 to 2008), MRSA
was isolated from clinical samples obtained from 1,230 pa-
tients. Of these patients, 824 (67%) were considered to have
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figure 2. Bimonthly incidence rates of healthcare-associated bacteremia due to (A) methicillin-susceptible and (B) methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus during the 4 different study periods (from January 1995 to December 2008) at Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena
in Seville, Spain.
an infection due to MRSA, and of these patients, 214 (26%)
had MRSA bacteremia. Of the 1,230 patients, 359 (29%) were
admitted to adult medical services, 406 (33%) were admitted
to adult surgical services, 455 (37%) were admitted to the
adult intensive care unit, and 10 (1%) were admitted to the
pediatric ward. The in-hospital crude mortality rate was 40%
(492 patients died). In addition, MRSA was isolated from
another 306 patients by means of surveillance samples only.
Data regarding the case mix of admitted patients during
the study periods are summarized in Table 2. The mean age
of admitted patients, the mean number of diagnoses per pa-
tient, and antibiotic consumption all tended to increase over
the course of the 13-year study period.
Analysis of the Impact of Interventions
Table 2 shows the mean numbers of cases (ie, incidence rates,
along with 95% confidence intervals) of colonization or in-
fection due to MRSA and of bacteremia due to MSSA and
MRSA during the 4 different study periods (periods A–D).
The percentage of patients detected by means of active sur-
veillance significantly increased during periods C and D, and
the percentage of patients admitted from another healthcare
This content downloaded from 150.214.182.14 on Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:17:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
792 infection control and hospital epidemiology august 2010, vol. 31, no. 8
table 3. Results of Segmented Regression Analysis of Incidences of Colonization or Infection due to Methicillin-Resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) and of Bacteremia due to MRSA and Methicillin-Susceptible S. aureus (MSSA), at Hospital
Universitario Virgen Macarena in Seville, Spain, 1995–2008
Value
MRSA colonization or infection MRSA bacteremia MSSA bacteremia
Coefficient (95% CI) P Coefficient (95% CI) P Coefficient (95% CI) P
b0 0.586 (0.498–0.674) !.001 0.100 (0.076–0.124) !.001 0.120 (0.093–0.148) !.001
b1 0.004 (0.16 to 0.008) .4 0.001 (0.003 to 0.004) .75 0.001 (0.003 to 0.005) .6
b2 0.030 (0.088 to 0.147) .5 0.018 (0.050 to 0.014) .2 0.015 (0.052 to 0.022) .4
b3 0.001 (0.016 to 0.0180) .8 0.002 (0.003 to 0.006) .4 0.005 (0.01 to 0.005) .9
b4 0.065 (0.053 to 0.182) .2 0.051 (0.083 to 0.020) .002 0.009 (0.046 to 0.028) .6
b5 0.045 (0.062 to 0.029) !.001 0.006 (0.010 to 0.01) .01 0.005 (0.005 to 0.005) .9
b6 0.077 (0.012 to 0.165) .04 0.002 (0.022 to 0.026) .8 0.001 (0.027 to 0.029) .9
b7 0.047 (0.035–0.059) !.001 0.003 (0.000–0.006) .05 0.001 (0.005 to 0.003) .7
note. b0, baseline incidence; b1, baseline trend; b2, change in incidence after first intervention; b3, change in trend after first intervention;
b4, change in incidence after second intervention; b5, change in trend after second intervention; b6, change in incidence after thir intervention;
b7, change in trend after third intervention; CI, confidence interval.
center who were detected by means of active surveillance
significantly increased during period D. The number of hos-
pital wards with new cases of MRSA colonization or infection
decreased from 28 (90%) of 31 hospital wards in period A
to 15 (48%) of 31 hospital wards in period D ( ).P ! .001
The evolution of the bimonthly incidences of colonization
or infection due to MRSA, bacteremia due to MRSA, and
bacteremia due to MSSA are shown in Figures 1 and 2. The
results of the segmented regression analysis are shown in Table
3. With regard to cases of colonization or infection due to
MRSA, the implementation of the first intervention (period
B) caused no significant changes in the incidence rate or in
the trend of incidence rates, compared with the preinterven-
tion period (period A). However, a very significant change
in trend was observed after the implementation of the second
intervention (period C); the change in the incidence rate was
not significant because the effect of the second intervention
only became noticeable after several months. The implemen-
tation of the third intervention (period D), when the inci-
dence rate was less than 0.1 cases per 1,000 patient-days,
caused no significant change in the incidence rate but was
followed by a significant change in slope, which was still
slightly downward during period D. With regard to cases of
bacteremia due to MRSA, the implementation of the first
intervention brought about no significant effect, whereas the
implementation of the second intervention was followed by
a significant change in the incidence rate and in the trend of
incidence rates (Figure 2B). There were no significant changes
in trend or rate for cases of bacteremia due to MSSA (Figure
2A). There was no increase in the percentage of multidrug-
resistant gram-negative organisms (data not shown). We
found no significant autocorrelation. As calculated for De-
cember 2000, the incidence of colonization or infection due
to MRSA and the incidence of bacteremia due to MRSA had
decreased from baseline by 83% and 80%, respectively.
Active Surveillance for MRSA in Patients and HCWs
During periods C and D, active surveillance was performed
in 22 wards (more than once in 5 of them): 1 adult intensive
care unit, 1 pediatric intensive care unit, 10 surgical wards,
and 10 medical wards. More than 90% of patients and HCWs
were screened in all wards. During active surveillance, 93%
of MRSA-colonized patients were detected by use of nasal
and skin swab samples. In all wards where active surveillance
was performed, 1 or more MRSA-colonized HCWs were de-
tected (range, 1–5 HCWs). Overall, 36 HCWs (30 nurses and
6 physicians) were colonized and treated according to the
decolonization protocol, but they were not prevented from
undertaking their clinical duties during treatment. Decolo-
nization was effective in every HCW but one, as confirmed
by follow-up screening; this HCW was a persistent carrier
whose sample yielded a mupirocin-resistant isolate; therefore,
this HCW agreed to be redeployed to a non–patient-care
workplace. Implementation of active surveillance was fol-
lowed by a rapid decrease in the number of new cases of
MRSA colonization in every ward except urology, where
there were 8 new cases the year after 2 MRSA-colonized
HCWs had been identified; however, 7 of these patients
had been admitted previously (1–3 years before the HCWs
were decolonized).
Microbiological Testing
Microbiological testing was performed on 90 selected MRSA
isolates obtained from blood culture samples and represen-
tative of all study periods and all wards. Twelve antimicrobial
resistance profiles were found; one profile (showing resistance
to ciprofloxacin) accounted for 35% of isolates, and another
profile (showing resistance to ciprofloxacin, erythromycin,
and clindamycin) accounted for 37% of isolates.
By use of PFGE, 12 different clones were found, although
This content downloaded from 150.214.182.14 on Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:17:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
control of endemic mrsa 793
75 (83%) of the 90 isolates were clonally related (clone A);
this clone was predominant throughout the different study
periods. Clonal relatedness was also studied in 5 different
clusters of cases of MRSA colonization from wards with sus-
pected ongoing MRSA transmission and included 20 clinical
isolates, 30 surveillance isolates from patients, and 10 isolates
from HCWs. In these 5 clusters, most of the isolates (range,
75%–100%) from the patients were clonally related. The iso-
lates that were recovered from HCWs belonged to 5 different
clones and were indistinguishable in all cases from the pre-
dominant clones recovered from patients admitted to their
wards.
discussion
Our results show that, in the context of the high rate of
hospital-wide endemicity, implementing active surveillance
for MRSA colonization in patients and HCWs, along with
the contact precautions in specific wards, was very effective
in decreasing rates of healthcare-associated colonization or
infection due to MRSA and healthcare-associated bacteremia
due to MRSA. Because MRSA bacteremia is associated with
high mortality and morbidity,1 reducing the MRSA bactere-
mia rate is clinically relevant. The effect of the intervention
cannot be explained by a clonal shift, changes in the case
mix, or changes antimicrobial consumption; furthermore, the
reduced rates were followed by a decrease in glycopeptide
consumption; no other drug-resistant organism replaced
MRSA. The reduction in the rates of MRSA colonization or
infection in our healthcare center was the reverse of the over-
all situation in Spanish hospitals (particularly in Andalusia),
with MRSA prevalence increasing significantly from 1993 to
2002 and stabilizing later at around 25%.5,11,12 Community-
acquired MRSA colonization or infection is still anecdotal in
our area,5,11,33 so that significant bias due to misclassification
of healthcare-associated MRSA colonization or infection is
highly improbable. Whether such results are attainable only
by applying measures to prevent nosocomial infections is
open to debate; the fact that MRSA control was achieved in
the context of an active global infection control program
developed some years before argues against this.
We implemented several bundles of MRSA control mea-
sures at different time points and, therefore, had the oppor-
tunity to evaluate the additive impact of the different bundles.
During the preintervention period, the incidences of MRSA
colonization or infection and MRSA bacteremia were con-
sistently high. Implementing contact precautions exclusively
for patients who were identified by means of a clinical sample
(during the first intervention) as being colonized or infected
caused no significant change in the incidence rates. No in-
controvertible evidence has been found that contact and iso-
lation precautions alone are effective in controlling MRSA.34
Clinical cultures are known to identify only part of the pa-
tient population with MRSA colonization,35 and an uniden-
tified reservoir (of mainly undetected MRSA-colonized pa-
tients and HCWs) was probably key to endemic MRSA
transmission.
Active surveillance for MRSA in MRSA-colonized patients
and HCWs was introduced next, and this intervention was
followed by a very significant reduction in incidence rates.
Because mathematical modeling suggested that the incidence
rates could be maintained by admitting MRSA-colonized pa-
tients in spite of adequate control,36 we later introduced sur-
veillance for MRSA in patients admitted from other health-
care centers as well as readmitted patients. This measure did
not reduce incidence rates further, and although it may have
contributed to keeping them low, the workload and cost in-
volved require closer analysis. Our approach during the third
intervention (period D) was similar to the “search and de-
stroy” strategy developed in the Netherlands,37 except for the
fact that we did not implement preemptive contact precau-
tions for patients admitted from other healthcare centers be-
fore the results of surveillance samples were made available.
After some years of debate, active surveillance is now rec-
ommended in most MRSA control guidelines.13-16 However,
controversy exists regarding the efficacy of active surveillance
in endemic situations,17,38 which microbiologic methods should
be used,9 and whether active surveillance should be performed
for all admitted patients or on targeted populations.8,9,38 An-
other interesting question is the importance of colonized
HCWs in MRSA epidemiology in endemic situations,38 which
may have been underestimated in some guidelines; our data
do not provide definite evidence but do suggest that the role
played by MRSA-colonized HCWs may have been significant
in some wards. We point out that, because MRSA was endemic
in all hospital wards, we prioritized active screening in wards
with higher rates of MRSA transmission; these wards were
identified by carefully analyzing data obtained by use of classic
clinical epidemiology. Our results suggest that the hidden res-
ervoir formed by colonized patients and HCWs played a key
role in maintaining the endemicity of MRSA. These data were
later confirmed by molecular analysis of selected isolates.
Our study has some limitations. The interventions were
not implemented according to an advance program but suc-
cessively after an interim analysis of the results, and our sta-
tistical analyses were performed retrospectively. We did not
systematically assess compliance with contact precautions or
the effectiveness of decolonization in patients. Segmented re-
gression allowed us to investigate the effect of the various
interventions, although only indirect controls for potential
confounding variables, such as antibiotic consumption or
changes in the case mix, could be assessed. Although we were
unable to control the potential impact of unnoticed inter-
ventions, the evolution of MSSA bacteremia rates provided
indirect evidence against a substantial effect. We did not an-
alyze the cost of the interventions. Finally, molecular typing
was only performed on selected isolates. In conclusion, the
results of our study suggest that control of endemic MRSA
is possible even in large hospitals by implementing compre-
hensive control programs that include active surveillance for
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MRSA in patients and HCWs in hospital units where MRSA
transmission has been identified after analysis of clinical ep-
idemiological data.
acknowledgments
We thank M. Beltra´n, PhD (Servicio de Farmacia, Hospital Universitario
Virgen Macarena, Seville, Spain), for providing the antibiotic consumption
data; A. D. Harris, MD (Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Med-
icine, University of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), for useful advice regarding
the analysis; and all members of the Infection Control and Antibiotic Policy
Committee at the Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena for their collab-
oration in the program.
Financial support. Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo; Instituto de Salud
Carlos III–Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional; Spanish Network for the
Research in Infectious Diseases (grant REIPI RD06/0008); Fondo de Inves-
tigacio´n Sanitaria (grant PI051019).
Potential conflicts of interest. All authors report no conflicts of interest
relevant to this article.
Address reprint requests to Jesu´s Rodrı´guez-Ban˜o, MD, PhD, Seccio´n de
Enfermedades Infecciosas, Hospital Universitario Virgen Macarena, Avda Dr
Fedriani 3, Sevilla 41009, Spain (jesusrb@us.es).
references
1. Cosgrove SE, Sakoulas G, Perencevich EN, Schwaber MJ, Karchmer AW,
Carmeli Y. Comparison of mortality associated with methicillin-resistant
and methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia: a meta-
analysis. Clin Infect Dis 2003;36:53–59.
2. Cosgrove SE, Carmeli Y. The impact of antimicrobial resistance on health
and economic outcomes. Clin Infect Dis 2003;36:1433–1437.
3. Tiemersma EW, Bronzwaer S, Lyytika¨inen O, et al. Methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus in Europe, 1999–2002. Emerg Infect Dis 2004;10:
1627–1634.
4. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. National Nosocomial In-
fections Surveillance (NNIS) system report, data summary from Janu-
ary 1992 through June 2004, issued October 2004. Am J Infect Control
2004;32:470–485.
5. Cuevas O, Cercenado E, Vindel A, et al. Evolution of the antimicrobial
resistance of Staphylococcus spp. in Spain: five nationwide prevalence
studies, 1986 to 2002. Antimicrob Agents Chemother 2004;48:4240–4245.
6. Tomic V, Sorli PS, Trinkaus D, Sorli J, Widmer A, Trampuz A. Com-
prehensive strategy to prevent nosocomial spread of methicillin-resis-
tant Staphylococcus aureus in a highly endemic setting. Arch Intern Med
2004;164:2038–2043.
7. Huang SS, Yokoe DS, Hinrichsen VL, et al. Impact of routine intensive
care unit surveillance cultures and resultant barrier precautions on hos-
pital-wide methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus bacteremia. Clin
Infect Dis 2006;43:971–978.
8. Chaberny IF, Schwab F, Ziesing S, Suerbaum S, Gastmeier P. Impact of
routine surgical ward and intensive care unit admission surveillance
culture on hospital-wide nosocomial methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus infections in a university hospital: an interrupted time-series anal-
ysis. J Antimicrob Chemother 2008;62:1422–1429.
9. Robicsek A, Beaumont JL, Paule SM, et al. Universal surveillance for
methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus in 3 affiliated hospitals. Ann
Intern Med 2008;148:409–418.
10. Chowers MY, Paitan Y, Sheva Gottesman B, Gerber B, Ben-Nissan Y,
Shitrit P. Hospital-wide methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus con-
trol program: a 5 year follow-up. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2009;30:
778–781.
11. Cuevas O, Cercenado E, Goyanes MJ, et al. Staphylococcus spp. en Espan˜a:
situacio´n actual y evolucio´n de la resistencia a antimicrobianos (1986–
2006). Enferm Infecc Microbiol Clin 2008;26:269–277.
12. European Antimicrobial Resistance Surveillance System. EARSS Annual
Report 2008. http://www.rivm.nl/earss/Images/EARSS%202008_final
_tcm61-65020.pdf. Accessed January 15, 2010.
13. Muto CA, Jernigan JA, Ostrowsky BE, et al. SHEA guideline for pre-
venting nosocomial transmission of multidrug-resistant strains of Staph-
ylococcus aureus and Enterococcus. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:
362–386.
14. Coia JE, Duckworth GJ, Edwards DI, et al; Joint Working Party of the
British Society of Antimicrobial Chemotherapy; Hospital Infection So-
ciety; Infection Control Nurses Association. Guidelines for the control
and prevention of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in
healthcare facilities [published correction appears in J Hosp Infect
2006;64(1):97–98]. J Hosp Infect 2006;63(suppl 1):S1–S44.
15. Siegel JD, Rhinehart E, Jackson M, Chiarello L; Healthcare Infection
Control Practices Advisory Committee. Management of multidrug-re-
sistant organisms in health care settings, 2006. Am J Infect Control 2007;
35(10 suppl 2):S165-S193.
16. Rodrı´guez-Ban˜o J, Bischofberger C, Alvarez-Lerma F, et al. Vigilancia y
el control de Staphylococcus aureus resistente a meticilina en hospitales
espan˜oles. Documento de consenso GEIH-SEIMC y SEMPSPH. Enferm
Infecc Microbiol Clin 2008;26:285–298.
17. Harbarth S. Control of endemic methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus au-
reus—recent advances and future challenges. Clin Microbiol Infect 2006;
12:1154–1162.
18. Preheim LC, Rimland D, Bittner MJ. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus in Veterans Administration medical centers. Infect Control 1987;
8:191–194.
19. Hails J, Kwaku F, Wilson AP, Bellingan G, Singer M. Large variation in
MRSA policies, procedures and prevalence in English intensive care units:
a questionnaire analysis. Intensive Care Med 2003;29:481–483.
20. Richet HM, Benbachir M, Brown DE, et al. Are there regional variations
in the diagnosis, surveillance, and control of methicillin-resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus? Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2003;24:334–341.
21. Rodrı´guez-Ban˜o J, Milla´n AB, Domı´nguez MA, et al. Medidas de control
de Staphylococcus aureus resistente a meticilina en hospitales espan˜oles.
Encuesta del proyecto SARM 2003 GEIH/GEMARA/REIPI. Enferm Infecc
Microbiol Clin 2006;24:149–156.
22. Stone SP, Cooper BS, Kibbler CC, et al. The ORION statement: guidelines
for transparent reporting of outbreak reports and intervention studies
of nosocomial infection. Lancet Infect Dis 2007;7:282–288.
23. Rodrı´guez-Ban˜o J, Garcı´a L, Ramı´rez E, et al. Long-term control of
hospital-wide endemic multidrug-resistant (MDR) Acinetobacter bau-
mannii through a comprehensive “bundle” approach. Am J Infect Control
2009;37:715–722.
24. Garner JS. Guideline for isolation precautions in hospitals. The Hospital
Infection Control Practices Advisory Committee [published correction
appears in Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 1996;17(4):214]. Infect Control
Hosp Epidemiol 1996;17(1):53–80.
25. Sehulster LM, Chinn RYW, Arduino MJ, et al. Guidelines for environ-
mental infection control in health-care facilities. Recommendations from
CDC and the Healthcare Infection Control Practices Advisory Com-
mittee (HICPAC). Atlanta, GA: US Department of Health and Hu-
man Services and Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, 2003.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dhqp/pdf/guidelines/Enviro_guide_03.pdf.
Accessed January 15, 2010.
26. Domı´nguez MA, Lencastre H, Lin˜ares J, Tomasz A. Spread and maintenance
of a dominant methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) disease
in a Spanish hospital. J Clin Microbiol 1994;32:2081–2087.
27. Tenover FC, Arbeit RD, Goering RV, et al. Interpreting chromosomal
DNA restriction patterns produced by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis:
criteria for bacterial strain typing. J Clin Microbiol 1995;33:2233–2239.
28. Cohen AL, Calfee D, Fridkin SK, et al. Recommendations for metrics
for multidrug-resistant organisms in healthcare settings: SHEA/HICPAC
position paper. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2008;29:901–913.
This content downloaded from 150.214.182.14 on Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:17:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
control of endemic mrsa 795
29. Wagner AK, Soumerai SB, Zhang F, Ross-Degnan D. Segmented re-
gression analysis of interrupted time series studies in medication use
research. J Clin Pharm Ther 2002;27:299–309.
30. Shardell M, Harris AD, El-Kamary SS, Furuno JP, Miller RM, Perencevich
EN. Statistical analysis and application of quasi experiments to anti-
microbial resistance intervention studies. Clin Infect Dis 2007;45:901–
907.
31. Raineri E, Crema L, De Silvestri A, et al. Meticillin-resistant Staphylo-
coccus aureus control in an intensive care unit: a 10 year analysis. J Hosp
Infect 2007;67:308–315.
32. Vaque´ J, Rosello´ J, Arribas JL. Prevalence of nosocomial infections in
Spain: EPINE study 1990–1997. EPINE Working Group. J Hosp Infect
1999;43(suppl):S105–S111.
33. Rodrı´guez-Ban˜o J, Angeles Domı´nguez M, Blas Milla´n A, et al; GEIH/
GEMARA (SEIMC); REIPI. Clinical and molecular epidemiology of com-
munity-acquired, healthcare-associated and nosocomial methicillin-re-
sistant Staphylococus aureus in Spain. Clin Microbiol Infect 2009;15(12):
1111–1118.
34. Cooper BS, Stone SP, Kibbler CC, et al. Isolation measures in the hospital
management of methicillin resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA): sys-
tematic review of the literature. BMJ 2004;329:533.
35. Salgado CD, Farr BM. What proportion of hospital patients colonized
with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus are identified by clinical
microbiological cultures? Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol 2006;27:116–121.
36. Bonten MJ, Austin DJ, Lipsitch M. Understanding the spread of antibiotic
resistant pathogens in hospitals: mathematical models as tools for control.
Clin Infect Dis 2001;33:1739–1746.
37. Vandenbroucke-Grauls CM. Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus
control in hospitals: the Dutch experience. Infect Control Hosp Epidemiol
1996;17:512–513.
38. Lessing MPA, Jordens JZ, Bowler ICJ. When should healthcare workers
be screened for methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus? J Hosp Infect
1996;34:205–210.
This content downloaded from 150.214.182.14 on Mon, 26 Feb 2018 13:17:11 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
